Bricks, Mortar, Sand - Corps of Engineers Construction Mediterranean and Middle East 1947-1991

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The ultimate aim is to impart to readers a more nuanced approach to those early days.

Suez Crisis

An appreciation 6 Jean E. Hans A. Schmitt Lawrence, Kans. See also Outlook Berlin, p. In the same accord, they agreed to split Berlin, the German capital, into three sectors. Despite the sector lines, however, the powers contemplated no administrative division of the city. Instead, they resolved to treat it as a single area under combined rule.

Thus, unlike the zones of Germany, which marked off spheres of political control, Berlin s sectors defined merely the physical location of the occupying forces. At the time, the contradiction between the principle of joint rule and the establishment of sectors was scarcely noticed. In the absence of sectors, the powers might have created an intermingled force of occupation with offices, guard posts, and quarters throughout the city, and with common facilities for communications and supplies.

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But the formation of sectors was the founding act of Cold War Berlin. Instead of mixed forces, cohesive national garrisons took shape in the assigned districts, and the Western areas soon became enclaves inside the Soviet sphere. The arrangements for joint rule reflected the degree of camaraderie and common cause that the wartime alliance had forged by For most leaders, whether civilian or military, the prospect of East-West conflict had scant effect on their conduct of the war or on their planning for the aftermath. At General Dwight D.

THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Eisenhower s insistence, U. Their goal in war was victory over Adolf Hitler s military machine, and their aim in peace was to control Germany, not the Soviet Union. These Americans had witnessed the devastation brought on by German aggression in Europe; knew the Soviets as generally reliable, if rather secretive, military allies; and believed cooperation might continue in the war s aftermath.

Aside from some bickering between Washington and London, the Allies concluded decisions on Germany with relative ease. Despite ongoing suspicions and tensions over Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe, most Anglo-American leaders saw no reason to assume that wartime cooperation, nourished in the comradeship of common struggle, must abruptly cease.

Without political sanction not to speak of Soviet participation their considerations were only tentative. Nonetheless, as an impulse to diplomacy, their contribution was critical. The process began in April when an Anglo-American joint staff in London initiated planning for the cross-channel invasion known as Operation Overlord. Heading this staff was British Lt.

Normandy โ€“ Arromanches

Frederick E. Morgan, whose title, chief of staff to the Supreme Allied Commander COSSAC , understated his de facto role as the acting supreme commander prior to the arrival of General Eisenhower in January In addition to Overlord, General Morgan had instructions to draft a parallel plan, code-named Rankin, to prepare Allied forces for an earlierthan-expected return to the continent in the event German resistance suddenly dissolved. Pointing to Germany s reverses on the Russian front, events in Italy and the Balkans, the Allied antisubmarine campaign, and the intensifying air offensive, the committee concluded that the enemy s situation was verging on desperate.

To meet Allied threats to Italy and the Balkans, the committee felt the Germans might transfer forces from Norway, Denmark, the Low Countries, and France; and if faced with imminent disaster on the Eastern Front, the Germans might abandon the whole of western and southern Europe in order to concentrate against the Soviets. His staff posited three cases: Case A denoted such a weakening of German strength as to permit an assault prior to the Overlord target date of 1 May ; Case B postulated a German withdrawal from the occupied territories; and Case C envisioned Germany s unconditional surrender.

Army Center of Military History, , pp. NACP , Encl to an. The planners did not specify an Eastern Zone of Germany, nor did they mention Berlin. Recognizing that such matters were beyond his purview, General Morgan stressed the urgent desirability of collaboration with the Soviet Union. If Rankin proved possible, he noted, Western and Soviet forces would come into contact at an early stage, and it seemed inappropriate to leave such an important juncture to happenstance.

In their meeting on 23 August, the chiefs approved the Rankin outline in principle, while specifying that it remain under continuous review, especially to determine whether airpower could substitute for ground forces; the American representatives expressed no view on the proposed zones of occupation. Several hours later, the chiefs met with the political leaders. President Franklin D. Roosevelt led off his remarks by asking whether a study was underway regarding an emergency entrance to the continent.

In the first apparent mention of Berlin in connection with Rankin, the president stated that he desired United Nations troops to be ready to get to Berlin as soon as the Russians. After General Sir Alan F. Brooke briefly summarized the three Rankin contingencies, the discussion proceeded to the main business, Overlord.

Attlee, it reflected a careful integration of diplomatic, political, and military viewpoints. Ber lin, inside the Soviet Zone, would become a separate area occupied by a mixed force of all three powers.

General Morgan delivered it personally to U. Marshall in October.

The recommendations, however, 3 Ibid. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested guidance from the president. Meeting with the Joint Chiefs in the admiral s cabin of the USS Iowa, the president discussed splitting Germany into three states, roughly defined by religion a Catholic southwestern state, a Protestant northwestern state, and a northeastern state whose religion was Prussianism.

He opposed the American occupation of a southwestern state because the United States would get involved with reconstituting France, a British baby. The United States should take northwest Germany, he declared. We can get our ships into such ports as Bremen and Hamburg and General Marshall explained to him that the British paper fit logically with invasion planning. Given that British forces were to operate in the north and American forces in the south, the proposed division of territory would correspond to deployments on the front.

There would be less entanglement in forces, supply lines would be shorter and more direct. To comply with the president s intentions, however, U. Roosevelt was unconvinced. He wanted the northwestern zone with its port facilities and reemphasized his desire to take Germany s capital.

Full text of "History Volume I"

There would definitely be a race for Berlin, he said, We may have to put United States divisions into Berlin as soon as possible. Using a National Geographic map of Germany provided by his naval adviser, R. Wilson Brown Jr. The president s demarcation cut across administrative and geographical boundaries. He included not only Berlin, but also Leipzig and Stettin in the U. Zone, ambitious claims that the British and the Soviets were unlikely to accept.

Joint Chiefs reworked the ideas of Roosevelt s sketch into a formal memorandum. Their proposal on the zones was three sparse sentences. Inexplicably, they dropped the president s demand for Berlin. Instead, Berlin would form part of the eastern boundary of the U.

At the same time, they claimed not only Leipzig and Stettin, but extended the American area farther east to take in the city of Cottbus, site of an important railroad junction. VI, ch. See also Earl F. Ziemke, The U. Army and the Occupation of Germany, p. The British objected, although not on account of the boundaries. Rather, they found the crossing of lines of communication militarily impossible. In early January, General Morgan rejected the U. Not only would the transport difficulties of a crossover prove insurmountable, particularly if it occurred after the invasion was well under way, but the diversion of staff to revising Rankin would severely impede preparations for Overlord.

Diplomats and chiefs of state would now resolve the debate that military planners had initiated. Molotov met in Moscow to prepare an agenda for the upcoming talks between the three heads of government in Tehran. In the course of these deliberations they signed a protocol establishing a standing committee to meet in London.


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The mission of that body the European Advisory Commission would be to formulate recommendations for postwar policy, particularly in regard to Germany. Winant and Feodor T.